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DEPENDENCE LOGIC WITH GENERALIZED QUANTIFIERS:
AXIOMATIZATIONS
FREDRIK ENGSTRO¨M, JUHA KONTINEN, AND JOUKO VA¨A¨NA¨NEN
Abstract. We prove two completeness results, one for the extension of depen-
dence logic by a monotone generalized quantifier Q with weak interpretation,
weak in the meaning that the interpretation of Q varies with the structures.
The second result considers the extension of dependence logic where Q is in-
terpreted as “there exists uncountable many.” Both of the axiomatizations are
shown to be sound and complete for FO(Q) consequences.
1. Introduction
Generalized quantifiers constitute a well-studied method of extending the ex-
pressive power of first order logic. A more recent extension of first order logic is
obtained by adding dependence atoms, permitting the expression of partially or-
dered quantification. In this paper we study the combination of the two methods,
adding to first order logic both generalized quantifiers and dependence atoms as
defined in [4]. It was shown in [5] that the resulting extension properly extends
both the respective extension by generalized quantifiers and the extension by de-
pendence atoms. We analyse further the expressive power and give natural axioms
for the new logic. There are theoretical limits to the extent that the axioms can be
complete but we give partial completeness results in the sense that completeness is
shown with respect to FO(Q) consequences.
Generalized quantifiers were introduced by Mostowski [16]. The most important
of them is perhaps the quantifier
M  Q1xφ(x, b¯) ⇐⇒ M  φ(a, b¯) for uncountably many a ∈M
owing to the beautiful axiomatization of it by Keisler [10]. On the other hand,
generalized quantifiers have made an entrance to both linguistics [17] and computer
science [11]. In natural language we can use generalized quantifiers to analyse
constructs such as
Most boys run,
where we think of “most” as a generalized quantifier. Other natural language
quantifiers are “two thirds”, “quite a few”, “many”, etc. There are various so-
called polyadic lifts of such quantifiers, for example,
Ramsey lift:
At least two thirds of the boys in your class like each other. [6]
Branching lift:
A few boys in my class and a few girls in your class have dated each other. [2]
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Resumption lift:
Most neighbours like each other. [6]
In computer science, or more exactly finite model theory, we have the counting
quantifiers
M  ∃≥kxφ(x, b¯) ⇐⇒ M  φ(a, b¯) for at least k elements a ∈M
which, although first order definable, have turn out relevant, but also the non-first
order
M  ∃
even
xφ(x, b¯) ⇐⇒ M  φ(a, b¯) for an even number of a ∈M
and
M  ∃n/2xφ(x, b¯) ⇐⇒ M  φ(a, b¯) for at least 50% of the elements a ∈M
and other similar ones. The lifts, also called vectorizations, are important in fi-
nite model theory, too. For example, the resumption lift sequence of the transi-
tive closure quantifiers characterises in ordered models NLOGSPACE [8], and the
resumption lift sequence of the so-called alternating transitive closure quantifier
characterises, even in unordered models, least fixpoint logic [3].
Dependence logic was introduced in [18]. It gives compositional semantics to the
partially ordered quantifiers of [7]:(
∀x ∃y
∀u ∃v
)
φ(x, y, u, v, z¯) ⇐⇒ ∃f∃g∀x∀uφ(x, f(x), u, g(u), z¯).
The compositional analysis is(
∀x ∃y
∀u ∃v
)
φ(x, y, u, v, z¯) ⇐⇒ ∀x∃y∀u∃v(=(z¯, u, v) ∧ φ(x, y, u, v, z¯)),
where =(z¯, u, v) is a so-called dependence atom. Dependence logic has the same
expressive power as existential second order logic [13]. Thus dependence logic alone
cannot express, for example, uncountability, in fact not even finiteness.
The idea of combining partially ordered quantifiers and generalized quantifiers
was first suggested by Barwise [2]. He used this combination to analyse lifts such as
the Ramsey lift and the branching lift. It was proved in [6] that the polyadic lifts
of monotone (unbounded) generalized quantifiers lead to a strong hierarchy, giving
immediately the result that there is no finite number of generalized quantifiers,
including partially ordered quantifiers, which would be able to express all Ramsey
lifts of a given monotone (unbounded) quantifier. The same is true of branching
lifts, and to a lesser extent of resumption lifts [6].
The situation is quite different with the extension of dependence logic (rather
than first order logic) by a monotone generalized quantifier. All the mentioned
polyadic lifts (and vectorizations) can be readily defined (in all arities). Let us see
how this is done for the Ramsey lift of a monotone quantifier Q.
∃A ∈ Q∀x ∈ A∀y ∈ Aφ(x, y, z¯)
⇐⇒
∃w(=(z¯, w) ∧Qx∃y( y = w ∧
∀u∃v(=(z¯, u, v) ∧ (x = u→ v = w)∧
∀u′∃v′(=(z¯, u′, v′) ∧ (u = u′ → v′ = w)∧
((v = w ∧ v′ = w)→ φ(u, u′, z¯))))))
Respectively, the branching lift can be expressed as follows:
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∃A ∈ Q∃B ∈ Q∀x ∈ A∀y ∈ Bφ(x, y, z¯)
⇐⇒
∃w,w′( =(z¯, w) ∧=(z¯, w′)∧
Qx∃y(y = w ∧=(z¯, x, y) ∧
Qx′∃y′(y′ = w′ ∧=(z¯, x′, y′) ∧
∀u∃v(=(z¯, u, v) ∧ (x = u→ v = w)∧
∀u′∃v′(=(z¯, u′, v′) ∧ (x′ = u′ → v′ = w′)∧
((v = w ∧ v′ = w′)→ φ(u, u′, z¯))))))
Resumption can be handled similarly.
Thus putting generalized quantifiers and dependence atoms together results in a
powerful combination extending far beyond either generalized quantifiers alone or
dependence atoms alone.
This paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we review the basics on depen-
dence logic and generalized quantifiers in the dependence logic context. In Section
3 we present a system of natural deduction for the extension D(Q, Qˇ) of depen-
dence logic by a monotone generalized quantifier Q and its dual Qˇ, and show that
these rules are sound. Finally in Section 4 two completeness results for FO(Q)
consequences are shown for D(Q, Qˇ). In the first result Q has the so-called weak
interpretation, and in the second Q is interpreted as Q1, that is, “there exists
uncountable many.”
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Dependence Logic. In this section we give a brief introduction to depen-
dence logic. For a detailed account see [18].
The syntax of dependence logic extends the syntax of first order logic with new
atomic formulas, the dependence atoms. There is one dependence atom for each
arity. We write the atom expressing that the term tn is uniquely determined by
the values of the terms t1, . . . , tn−1 as =(t1, . . . , tn). We consider formulas where
negation can only appear in front of formulas without dependence atoms. For a
vocabulary τ , D[τ ] denotes the set of τ -formulas of dependence logic. The set FV(φ)
of free variables of a formula φ is defined as in first order logic except that
FV(=(t1, . . . , tn)) = FV(t1) ∪ . . . ∪ FV(tn).
To define a compositional semantics for dependence logic we use sets of as-
signments, called teams, instead of single assignments as in first order logic. An
assignment is a function s : V → M where V is a finite set of variables and M is
the universe under consideration. A team on M is a set of assignments for some
fixed finite set of variables V . If V = ∅ there is only one assignment, the empty
function ∅. Observe that the team of the empty assignment { ∅ } is different from
the empty team ∅.
• Given an assignment s : V →M and a ∈ M let s[a/x] : V ∪ { x } →M be
the assignment:
s[a/x] : y 7→
{
s(y) if y ∈ V \ { x }, and
a if x = y.
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• Let X [M/y] be the team
{ s[a/y] | s ∈ X, a ∈M } ,
• and whenever f : X →M , let X [f/y] denote the team
{ s[f(s)/y] | s ∈ X } .
The domain of a non-empty team X , denoted dom(X), is the set of variables V .
The interpretation of the term t in the model M under the assignment s is denoted
by tM,s. We write s(x¯) for the tuple obtained by pointwise application of s to the
finite sequence x¯ of variables.
The satisfaction relation for dependence logic M, X  φ is defined as follows.
Below, the notation M, s  φ refers to the ordinary satisfaction relation of first
order logic. We also assume that FV(φ) ⊆ dom(X).
(1) For formulas ψ without dependence atoms: M, X  ψ iff ∀s ∈ X :M, s  ψ.
(2) M, X  =(t1, . . . , tn+1) iff ∀s, s′ ∈ X :
∧
1≤i≤n t
M,s
i = t
M,s′
i → t
M,s
n+1 = t
M,s′
n+1
(3) M, X  φ ∧ ψ iff M, X  φ and M, X  ψ
(4) M, X  φ ∨ ψ iff there are Y and Z such that X = Y ∪ Z, and M, Y 
φ and M, Z  ψ
(5) M, X  ∃yφ iff there is f : X →M, such that M, X [f/y]  φ
(6) M, X  ∀yφ iff M, X [M/y]  φ.
We define M  σ for a sentence σ to hold if M, { ∅ }  σ. Let us make some easy
remarks.
• Every formula is satisfied by the empty team.
• The satisfaction relation is downwards closed: IfM, X  φ and Y ⊆ X then
M, Y  φ.
• The satisfaction relation is local: M, X  φ iff M, Y  φ where
Y = { s ↾ FV(φ) | s ∈ X } .
The expressive power for sentences of dependence logic is the same as that of
existential second order logic.
2.2. D(Q). The notion of a generalized quantifier goes back to Mostowski [16] and
Lindstro¨m [14]. In [4] semantics for generalized quantifiers in the framework of
dependence logic was introduced. We will review the definitions below.
Let Q be a quantifier of type 〈k〉, meaning that Q is a class of τ -structures,
where the signature τ has a single k-ary relation symbol. Also, assume that Q is
monotone increasing, i.e., for every M and every A ⊆ B ⊆ Mk, if A ∈ QM then
also B ∈ QM , where QM = {R ⊆Mk | (M,R) ∈ Q }.
The formulas of dependence logic extended with a quantifier Q, D(Q), is built
up from FO(Q)-formulas and dependence atoms using the connectives ∧ and ∨,
and the quantifier expressions ∃x, ∀x and Qx in the usual way. We write φ→ ψ as
a shorthand for ¬φ ∨ ψ, where φ is a formula without dependence atoms.
An assignment s satisfies a formula Qx¯φ in a structure M,
M, s  Qx¯φ, if the set { a¯ ∈Mk |M, s[a¯/x¯]  φ } is in QM .
In the context of teams we say that a team X satisfies a formula Qx¯φ,
(1) M, X  Qx¯φ, if there exists F : X → QM such that M, X [F/x¯]  φ,
where X [F/x¯] = { s[a¯/x¯] | a¯ ∈ F (s) }. This definition works well only with mono-
tone (increasing) quantifiers, see [4] for details.
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The following easy proposition suggests that we indeed have the right truth
condition for monotone quantifiers:
Proposition 2.1 ([4]). (i) D(Q) is downwards closed.
(ii) D(Q) is local, in the sense that M, X  φ iff M, (X ↾ FV(φ))  φ.
(iii) Viewing ∃ and ∀ as generalized quantifiers of type 〈1〉, the truth conditions in
(1) are equivalent to the truth conditions of dependence logic.
(iv) For every D(Q) formula φ we have M, ∅  φ.
As proved in [5], the expressive power of D(Q) sentences corresponds to that of
a certain natural extension of existential second order logic by Q.
In order to get a prenex normal form for all formulas we will focus on the logics
D(Q, Qˇ), where Qˇ is the dual of Q, i.e,
Qˇ = { (M,Mk \R) | R ⊆Mk, (M,R) /∈ Q } ,
instead of D(Q). Note that, according to our definition of D(Q), a formula Qxφ
may be negated only if φ is a FO(Q) formula.
We will consider monotone increasing quantifiers Q satisfying two non-triviality
assumptions: (M, ∅) /∈ Q and (M,Mk) ∈ Q for all M . In [5] the following normal
form for sentences of D(Q) was shown for such non-trivial quantifiers.
Theorem 2.2. Every D(Q) sentence in negation normal form, where Q is non-
trivial, can be written as
H1x¯1 . . .H
mx¯m∃y1 . . .∃yn
( ∧
1≤j≤n
=(z¯i, yi) ∧ θ
)
,
where Hi is either Q or ∀ and θ is a quantifer-free FO-formula.
In the present paper a similar normal form for all D(Q, Qˇ) formulas is obtained
in Proposition 4.1.
A weak semantics can be given for D(Q) (and FO(Q), etc) by regarding Q as an
interpreted symbol rather than a logical constant in the following way (see [10] and
[9] for more on this). A weak model is a structure together with an interpretation
of Q, often denoted by q. We define T w σ to hold if every weak model (M, q) of
T satisfies σ. In this paper we require the interpretation q of Q to be monotone
increasing and non-trivial (In essence this is the monotone logic of [15]). In the
weak semantics for D(Q, Qˇ) we require that the interpretation qˇ of Qˇ is the dual
of the interpretation q of Q. Thus, if T ∪ { σ } consists of D(Q, Qˇ) sentences, then
T w σ if every model (M, q, qˇ) of T satisfies σ.
3. Natural deduction for D(Q, Qˇ)
In this section we present a set of natural deduction rules for the logic D(Q, Qˇ),
where Q is monotone and satisfies the non-triviality conditions: (M, ∅) /∈ Q and
(M,Mk) ∈ Q for allM . Observe that then also the dual quantifier Qˇ satisfies these
conditions. To simplify notation, we will restrict attention to type 〈1〉 quantifiers.
We use an abbreviation x¯ = y¯ for the formula
∧
1≤i≤len(x¯) xi = yi, assuming of
course that x¯ and y¯ are tuples of the same length len(x¯). The substitution of a
term t to the free occurrences of x in ψ is denoted by ψ[t/x]. Analogously to first
order logic, no variable of t may become bound in such a substitution. For tuples
t¯ = (t1, . . . , tn) and x¯ = (x1, . . . , xn) we write ψ[t¯/x¯] to denote the simultaneous
substitution of xi by ti for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
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Here is a list of all the rules:
(1) Conjunction:
φ ψ
φ ∧ ψ
∧I
φ ∧ ψ
φ
∧E
φ ∧ ψ
ψ
∧E
(2) Disjunction:
φ
φ ∨ ψ
∨I
ψ
φ ∨ ψ
∨I φ ∨ ψ
[φ]
....
γ
[ψ]
....
γ
γ ∨E
where γ is a FO(Q, Qˇ) formula.
(3) Negation and duality:
[φ]
....
⊥
¬φ
¬I
[¬φ]
....
⊥
φ
RAA
φ ¬φ
⊥
⊥I
Qˇxφ
¬Qx¬φ
where φ is a FO(Q, Qˇ) formula.
(4) Universal quantifier:
φ
∀xiφ
∀I
∀xiφ
φ[t/xi]
∀E
In ∀I the variable xi cannot appear free in any non-discharged assumption
used in the derivation of φ.
(5) Existential quantifier:
φ(t/xi)
∃xiφ
∃I
∃xiφ
[φ]
....
ψ
ψ
∃E
In ∃E the variable xi cannot appear free in ψ and in any non-discharged
assumption used in the derivation of ψ, except in φ.
(6) Disjunction substitution:
φ ∨ ψ
[ψ]
....
γ
φ ∨ γ
(7) Commutation and associativity of disjunction:
ψ ∨ φ
φ ∨ ψ
(φ ∨ ψ) ∨ γ
φ ∨ (ψ ∨ γ)
(8) Extending scope:
Hxφ ∨ ψ
Hx(φ ∨ ψ)
Qxφ ∧ ψ
Qx(φ ∧ ψ)
where H ∈ {Q, Qˇ, ∃, ∀}, and the prerequisite for applying these rules is that
x does not appear free in ψ. The rule on the right is also assumed for Qˇ.
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(9) Unnesting:
=(t1, ..., tn)
∃z(=(t1, ..., z, ..., tn) ∧ z = ti)
where z is a new variable.
(10) Dependence distribution: let
φ = ∃y1 . . . ∃yn(
∧
1≤j≤n
=(z¯j, yj) ∧ φ0),
ψ = ∃yn+1 . . . ∃ym(
∧
n+1≤j≤m
=(z¯j, yj) ∧ ψ0).
where φ0 and ψ0 are quantifier-free formulas without dependence atoms,
and yi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, does not appear in ψ and yi, for n+1 ≤ i ≤ m, does
not appear in φ. Then,
φ ∨ ψ
∃y1 . . . ∃ym(
∧
1≤j≤m=(z¯
j, yj) ∧ (φ0 ∨ ψ0))
(11) Dependence introduction:
∃x∀yφ
∀y∃x(=(z¯, x) ∧ φ)
∃xQyφ
Qy∃x(=(z¯, x) ∧ φ)
where z¯ lists the variables in FV(φ)− {x, y}. Similar for Qˇ.
(12) Monotonicity of Q and Qˇ:
Qxφ
[φ]
....
ψ
Qxψ
where the prerequisite for applying this rule is that the variable x cannot
appear free in any non-discharged assumption used in the derivation of ψ,
except for φ. Similar for Qˇ.
(13) Bound variables:
Qxφ
Qyφ[y/x],
where y does not appear in φ. Similar for Qˇ.
(14) Identity rules:
t = t
φ[r/x] t = r
φ[t/x]
where φ is an FO(Q, Qˇ) formula.
Observe that FO(Q, Qˇ) ≡ FO(Q), but syntactically FO(Q, Qˇ) includes more
formulas.
3.1. Soundness of the rules. In this section we show the soundness of the rules
introduced in the previous section under any monotone and non-trivial interpreta-
tion of Q. Clearly this is the same as soundness in the weak semantics for Q.
The following lemmas will be needed in the proof.
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Lemma 3.1. Let φ(x) be a D(Q, Qˇ) formula, and t a term such that in the substi-
tution φ[t/x] no variable of t becomes bound. Then for all M and teams X, where
(FV(φ)− {x}) ∪Var(t) ⊆ dom(X)
M, X  φ[t/x]⇔M, X [F/x]  φ(x),
where F : X → A is defined by F (s) = tM,s.
Proof. Analogous to Lemma 8 in [12]. 
It is easy to verify that Lemma 3.1 gives the following familiar property concern-
ing changing free variables.
Lemma 3.2 (Change of free variables). Let the free variables of φ ∈ D(Q, Qˇ) be
x1, . . . , xn and let y1, . . . , yn be distinct variables. Then for all structures M and
teams X with domain {x1, . . . , xn} it holds that
M, X  φ⇔M, X ′  φ[y¯/x¯],
where X ′ is the team with domain {y1, . . . , yn} containing the assignments s
′ : yi 7→
s(xi) for s ∈ X.
Proposition 3.3. Assume that Q is monotone and non-trivial. Let T ∪ {φ} be a
set of sentences of D(Q, Qˇ). If T ⊢ φ, then T  φ.
Proof. We prove the statement that if T ⊢ φ, where T ∪ {φ } is a set of formulas,
then for anyM andX where dom(X) ⊇ FV(T )∪FV(φ), ifM, X  T thenM, X  φ.
This is done by using induction on the length of derivation.
It suffices to consider the rules 3 (only duality), 8, 11, 12, and 13 since the
soundness of the other rules can be proved analogously to [12] using the fact that
D(Q, Qˇ) is local and has downwards closure (see (ii) and (i) of Proposition 2.1). In
particular, Lemma 3.1 is used in the soundness proofs of the rules ∃ I and ∀ E.
(3) AssumeM, X  Qˇxφ then, since Qˇxφ is a FO(Q, Qˇ) formula we haveM, s 
Qˇxφ for all s ∈ X . This clearly implies that M, s  ¬Qx¬φ for all s ∈ X ,
which is equivalent to M, X  ¬Qx¬φ.
(8) These rules preserve logical equivalence analogously to Lemma 3.2 in [5].
(11) The soundness of this rule follows from the logical equivalence
Qy∃x(=(z¯, x) ∧ φ) ≡ ∃xQyφ
the proof of which is analogous to the case where Q is replaced by ∀ (see
[12]).
(12) Assume that we have a natural deduction proof of Qxψ from the assump-
tions
{γ1, . . . , γk}
with the last rule 13. Let M and X be such that M, X  φi, for 1 ≤
i ≤ k. By the assumption, we have a shorter deduction of Qxφ from
the assumptions {γn1 , . . . , γnl} and a deduction of ψ from the assump-
tions {φ, γnl+1 , . . . , γnm}. Hence by the induction assumption it holds that
M, X  Qxφ. Therefore, there is F : X → QM such that M, X [F/x]  φ.
Since the variable x cannot appear free in the formulas γnl+1 , . . . , γnm it
follows thatM, X [F/x]  γi, for i ∈ {nl+1, . . . , nm }. Now by the induction
assumption we get that M, X [F/x]  ψ and M, X  Qxψ.
(13) This rule preserves logical equivalence by Lemma 3.2. 
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Note that since Proposition 3.3 holds for every monotone non-trivial quantifier
Q we get also soundness for weak semantics: If T ⊢ φ then T w φ.
4. Completeness results for FO(Q, Qˇ) consequences
4.1. Deriving a normal form for D(Q, Qˇ). In this section we show that from
each formula φ ∈ D(Q, Qˇ) we can derive a logically equivalent formula in the
following normal form:
(2) H1x1 . . .H
mxm∃y1 . . . ∃yn
( ∧
1≤j≤n
=(x¯i, yi) ∧ θ
)
,
where Hi is either Q, Qˇ or ∀, and θ is a quantifier-free FO-formula.
Proposition 4.1. Let φ be a formula of D(Q, Qˇ). Then φ ⊢ φ′, where φ′ is of the
form (2), and φ′ is logically equivalent to φ.
Proof. The proof of this Proposition is analogous to the proof of the corresponding
result for dependence logic formulas in [12]. We will indicate how the proof of [12]
can be extended for the formulas of D(Q, Qˇ).
We will establish the claim in several steps. Without loss of generality, we assume
that in φ each variable is quantified only once and that, in the dependence atoms
of φ, only variables (i.e. no complex terms) occur.
Step 1. We derive from φ an equivalent sentence in prenex normal form:
(3) H1x1 . . .H
mxmχ,
where Hi ∈ {∃, ∀, Q, Qˇ} and χ is a quantifier-free formula.
We will prove the claim for every formula φ satisfying the assumptions
made in the beginning of the proof and the assumption (if φ has free vari-
ables) that no variable appears both free and bound in φ. It suffices to
consider the case φ := ψ ∨ θ, since the case of conjunction is analogous and
the other cases are trivial.
By the induction assumption, we have derivations ψ ⊢ ψ∗ and θ ⊢ θ∗,
where
ψ∗ = H1x1 . . .H
mxmψ0,
θ∗ = Hm+1xm+1 . . .H
m+nxm+nθ0,
and ψ ≡ ψ∗ and θ ≡ θ∗. Now φ ⊢ ψ∗∨θ∗, using two applications of the rule
6. Next we prove using induction on m that, from ψ∗ ∨ θ∗, we can derive
(4) H1x1 . . .H
mxmH
m+1xm+1 . . .H
m+nxm+n(ψ0 ∨ θ0).
Let m = 0. We prove this case again by induction; for n = 0 the claim
holds. Suppose that n = l+1. We assume that H1 = Q. The case H1 = Qˇ
is analogous, and the cases H1 ∈ {∃, ∀} are handled exactly as in [12]. The
following deduction now shows the claim:
(1) ψ0 ∨Qx1 . . .Hnxnθ0
(2) Qx1 . . .Hnxnθ0 ∨ ψ0 (rule 7)
(3) Qx1(H2x2 . . .Hnxnθ0 ∨ ψ0) (rule 8)
(4) Qx1 . . .Hnxn(ψ0 ∨ θ0) (rule 12 and D1),
where D1 is the derivation
(1) H2x2 . . .Hnxnθ0 ∨ ψ0
(2) .
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(3) .
(4) .
(5) H2x2 . . .Hnxn(θ0 ∨ ψ0) (induction assumption)
(6) .
(7) .
(8) .
(9) H2x2 . . .Hnxn(ψ0 ∨ θ0) (D2)
where D2 is a derivation that swaps the disjuncts. This concludes the proof
for the case m = 0.
Assume then that m = k + 1 and that the claim holds for k. Now
the following derivation shows the claim. Again we consider only the case
H1 = Q.
(1) Qx1H
2x2 . . .H
mxmψ0 ∨H
m+1xm+1 . . .H
m+nxm+nθ0
(2) Qx1(H2x2 . . .Hmxmψ0 ∨Hm+1xm+1 . . .Hm+nxm+nθ0) (rule 8)
(3) Qx1 . . .HmxmHm+1xm+1 . . .Hm+nxm+n(ψ0 ∨ θ0) (rule 12 and D3)
where D3 is the following derivation given by the induction assumption:
(1) H2x2 . . .Hmxmψ0 ∨Hm+1xm+1 . . .Hm+nxm+nθ0
(2) .
(3) .
(4) .
(5) H2x2 . . .HmxmHm+1xm+1 . . .Hm+nxm+n(ψ0 ∨ θ0)
This concludes the proof.
Step 2. The next step is to show that from a quantifier-free formula θ it is possible
to derive an equivalent formula of the form:
(5) ∃z1 . . .∃zn(
∧
1≤j≤n
=(x¯j , zj) ∧ θ
∗),
where θ∗ is a quantifier-free formula without dependence atoms. Again the
claim is proved using induction on θ using in particular rule 10. Note that
the quantifier Q does not play any role in this step, hence the claim can be
proved exactly as in [12].
Step 3. The deductions in Step 1 and 2 can be combined (from φ to (3), and then
from θ to (5)) to show that
(6) φ ⊢ H1x1 . . .H
mxm∃z1 . . .∃zn(
∧
1≤j≤n
=(x¯j , zj) ∧ θ
∗).
Note that for Hi = Q, rule 12 is needed in this deduction.
Step 4. We transform the Hi-quantifier prefix in (6) to the required form (see (2))
by using rule 11 and pushing the new dependence atoms as new conjuncts
to
(7)
∧
1≤j≤n
=(x¯j , zj).
We prove the claim using induction on the length m of the H-quantifier
block in (6). For m = 0 the claim holds. Suppose that the claim holds
for k and m = k + 1. We consider first the case H1 = Q. The following
derivation now shows the claim:
(1) Qx1H2x2 . . .Hmxm∃z1 . . .∃zn(
∧
1≤j≤n=(x¯
j , zj) ∧ θ∗)
(2) Qx1H
i1xi1 · · · H
ihxih∃x¯
′∃z¯(
∧
1≤j≤n′ =(x¯
j , wj) ∧ θ
∗) (rule 12 and D4)
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where Hij , for 1 ≤ j ≤ h, is either Q, Qˇ or ∀, and D4 is the following
derivation that exists by the induction assumption:
(1) H2x2 . . .Hmxm∃z1 . . . ∃zn(
∧
1≤j≤n=(x¯
j , zj) ∧ θ∗)
(2) .
(3) .
(4) .
(5) Hi1xi1 · · · H
ihxih∃x¯
′∃z¯(
∧
1≤j≤n′ =(x¯
j , wj) ∧ θ∗)
The case H1 = ∀ can be proved analogously. Next we consider the case
H1 = ∃ and Hi = ∃ for all 2 ≤ i ≤ m. In this case the quantifier H1
is already in the right place in the quantifier prefix. We will record the
variables determiningH1 by a new dependence atom and then move it to the
quantifier free part of the formula. This is done because each existentially
quantified variable is determined by one and only one dependence atom in
the normal form (2). We will use the following auxiliary derivation D5:
(1) ∃xχ(z¯)
(2) ∃x∀yχ(z¯) (∃ E and D6)
(3) ∀y∃x(=(z¯, x) ∧ χ(z¯)) (rule 10)
(4) ∃x(=(z¯, x) ∧ χ(z¯)) (∀ E),
where D6 refers to the following derivation
(1) χ(z¯, x)
(2) ∀yχ(z¯, x) (∀ I with y a fresh variable)
(3) ∃x∀yχ(z¯) (∃ I)
Let us now prove the case H1 = ∃ with Hi = ∃ for all 2 ≤ i ≤ m.
(1) ∃x1∃x2 . . . ∃xm∃z1 . . . ∃zn(
∧
1≤j≤n=(x¯
j , zj) ∧ θ∗)
(2) ∃x1∃x2 . . . ∃xm∃z1 . . . ∃zn(
∧
1≤j≤n+m−1=(x¯
j , wj) ∧ θ∗) (∃ E and D7)
(3) ∃x1(=(x¯n+m, x1) ∧ ∃x2 . . . ∃xm∃z¯(
∧
1≤j≤n+m−1=(x¯
j , wj) ∧ θ∗)) (D5)
(4) ∃x1∃x2 . . . ∃xm∃z1 . . . ∃zn(
∧
1≤j≤n+m=(x¯
j , wj) ∧ θ∗) (D8)
where D7 is a derivation that exists by the induction assumption, and D8
is a derivation that pushes =(x¯n+m, x1) into the quantifier free part of the
formula. The case H1 = ∃, where Hi = ∀ for some 2 ≤ i ≤ m can be
proved similarly to [12] adding one additional trasformation in which the
redundant dependence atoms (created not by the first swap of H1 with ∀,
Q, or Qˇ) are deleted from the formula using essentially the rule ∧ E.
Steps 1-4 show that from a formula φ a formula of the form can be deduced
(8) H1x1 . . .H
mxm∃y1 . . . ∃yn
( ∧
1≤j≤n
=(x¯i, yi) ∧ θ
)
,
where Hi is either Q, Qˇ or ∀ and θ is a quantifier-free FO-formula. Furthermore, φ
and the formula in (8) are logically equivalent since logical equivalence is preserved
in each of the Steps 1-4. 
4.2. Completeness for D(Q, Qˇ). In this section we prove a completeness result for
D(Q, Qˇ) with respect to FO(Q, Qˇ) consequences of D(Q, Qˇ)-sentences, with weak
semantics. Analogously to [12], we approximate D(Q, Qˇ)-sentences in the normal
form (2) by an infinite set of FO(Q, Qˇ) sentences. We use an extra predicate R to
encode a team witnessing the satisfiability of the quantifier prefix H1x1 . . .H
mxm.
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Let σ be
H1x1 . . .H
mxm∃y1 . . . ∃yn
( ∧
1≤i≤n
=(x¯i, yi) ∧ θ(x1, . . . , xm, y1, . . . , yn)
)
,
where each Hi is either Q, Qˇ or ∀.
We define finite approximations Aiσ of σ as follows. The first approximation,
A1σ, is
∀x1 . . . ∀xm∃y1 . . . ∃yn
(
R(x1, . . . , xm)→ θ(x1, . . . , xm, y1, . . . , yn)
)
,
or in compressed form:
∀x¯∃y¯
(
R(x¯)→ θ(x¯, y¯)
)
.
The second approximation A2σ is
∀x¯1∃y¯1∀x¯2∃y2
(
R(x¯1) ∧R(x¯2)→ θ(x¯1, y¯1) ∧ θ(x¯2, y¯2) ∧∧
1<i<n
(x¯i1 = x¯
i
2 → yi,1 = yi,2)
)
With the notational convention that (xi1 , . . . , xik )j is the sequence (xi1,j , . . . , xik,j).
By generalizing this construction we get the k:th approximation:
∀x¯1∃y¯1 . . . ∀x¯k∃y¯k
( ∧
1≤j≤k
R(x¯j)→
∧
1≤j≤k
θ(x¯j , y¯j) ∧
∧
1≤i≤n
1≤j,j′≤k
(x¯ij = x¯
i
j′ → yi,j = yi,j′)
)
Also we need a sentence saying that R is of the right kind, witnessing the quan-
tifier prefix: Let Bσ be
H1x1 . . .H
mxmR(x1, . . . , xm).
We will adopt the following approximation rule in our deduction system:
σ
[Bσ]
. . .
[Anσ]
. .
.
ψ
(Approx)
ψ
where σ is a sentence in normal form, and R does not appear in ψ nor in any
uncancelled assumptions in the derivation of ψ, except for Bσ and Anσ.
Lemma 4.2. Adding the approximation rule to the inference system results in a
sound system for D(Q, Qˇ) with regard to weak semantics.
Proof. We plug in the following induction step to the proof of Proposition 3.3:
Assume that there is a derivation of ψ from Γ ending with the approximation
rule. Then there are shorter derivations from Γ of σ and from Γ′, Bσ,Anσ of ψ,
where Γ′ ⊆ Γ is such that R does not occur in Γ′. By the induction hypothesis we
get Γ  σ and Γ′, Bσ,Anσ  ψ. We will prove that Γ  ψ, by assuming M, X  Γ
for some non-empty X and proving that M, X  ψ.
Assume σ is of the form
H1x1 . . .H
mxm∃y1 . . . ∃yn
( ∧
1≤i≤n
=(x¯i, yi) ∧ θ
)
.
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where θ is a quantifier free first order formula.
From the fact that M, X  σ we getM  σ and thus there is a (non-empty) team
Y such that
M, Y  ∃y1 . . . ∃yn
( ∧
1≤i≤n
=(x¯i, yi) ∧ θ
)
.
Let r ⊆ Mm be the relation Y (x¯) corresponding to Y . Then (M, r)  Bσ and,
it should also be clear that (M, r)  Anσ. Since R does not occur in Γ′ we have
(M, r), X  Γ′, Bσ,Anσ. By the induction hypothesis (M, r), X  ψ, and since R
does not occur in ψ we have M, X  ψ. 
The main result of this section can now be stated as follows.
Theorem 4.3. Let T be a set of sentences of D(Q, Qˇ) and φ ∈ FO(Q, Qˇ) a sen-
tence. Then the following are equivalent:
(I): T w φ
(II): T ⊢ φ
The following lemmas are needed in the proof.
Lemma 4.4. If T is a set of FO(Q, Qˇ)-sentences consistent in the deduction system
described above then there are a countable recursively saturated model M and an
interpretation q of Q such that (M, q, qˇ)  T .
Proof. First translate T to T¬ in which each Qˇxφ is replaced by ¬Qx¬φ. By
using the same argument as in [10, 9] we may reduce FO(Q) to FO by replacing
subformulas of the form Qxφ with new relation symbols Rφ(y¯), y¯ being the free
variables of Qxφ. This will reduce the set T¬ to a set T ∗. Let T ′ be T ∗ together
with the translations of the universal closures of
• (φ→ ψ)→ (Qxφ→ Qxψ), for all φ and ψ; and
• Qxφ→ Qy(φ[y/x]), for all φ such that the substitution is legal.
Now T ′ is consistent by the same argument as in [9]. Let M∗ be a countable
recursively saturated model of T ′, and M its reduct to the original signature. Now
we may define q to be
{A ⊆M | A ⊇ { a ∈M |M∗, s[a/x]  φ∗ } for some φ s.t. M∗, s  Qxφ∗ } .
Proposition 2.3.4 in [9] shows that (M, q)  T¬, and thus (M, q, qˇ)  T . 
Lemma 4.5. In a countable recursively saturated weak model (M, q, qˇ) in which
Bσ and Anσ holds for all n, σ holds.
Proof. Suppose σ is
H1x1 . . .H
mxm∃y1 . . . ∃yn
( ∧
1≤i≤n
=(x¯i, yi) ∧ θ
)
.
Note that the sentences Anσ can be viewed as the finite approximations as defined
in [12] (and see also [1]) of the D sentence σ′:
∀x¯∃y¯
( ∧
1≤i≤n
=(x¯i, yi) ∧ (R(x¯)→ θ)
)
.
Thus by Theorem 2.4 in [1] (see also [12]), we know that M  σ′.
LetX be the team { s : { x1, . . . , xk } →M | (s(x1), . . . , s(xm)) ∈ RM }. To prove
that (M, q, qˇ)  σ we find F1, . . . , Fm so that { ∅ } [F1/x1] . . . [Fm/xm] = X.
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F1(∅) = X ↾ { x1 } ,
Fi+1 : { ∅ } [F1/x1] . . . [Fi/xi]→M
Fi+1(s) = { a ∈M | ∃s
′ ∈ X : (s′(x1), . . . , s
′(xi+1)) = (s(x1), . . . , s(xi), a) } .
By the assumption (M, q, qˇ)  Bσ it follows that Fi(s) ∈ HiM . Furthermore, since
M  σ′ we get that
M, X  ∃y1 . . .∃yn
( ∧
1≤i≤n
=(x¯i, yi) ∧ θ
)
.
Therefore
(M, q, qˇ)  H1x1 . . .H
mxm∃y1 . . . ∃yn
( ∧
1≤i≤n
=(x¯i, yi) ∧ θ
)
as wanted. 
Proof of Theorem 4.3. (I)⇒ (II): This is just a special case (for sentences) of sound-
ness.
(II) ⇒ (I): Suppose T 0 φ, where φ is a FO(Q, Qˇ)-sentence. We will construct
a weak model of T ∪ {¬φ } showing that T 2w φ. Replacing T with the set
T ′ = {Bσ,Anσ | σ ∈ T, n ∈ N } we can conclude that T ′∪{¬φ } 0 ⊥. By applying
Lemma 4.4 we get a weak countable recursively saturated model (M, q, qˇ) of T ′.
Lemma 4.5 implies that (M, q, qˇ)  T . Now since (M, q, qˇ) 2 φ, we get T 6w φ as
wanted. 
4.3. Completeness for D(Q1, Qˇ1). We will now prove a completeness result sim-
ilar to Theorem 4.3 for the logic D(Q, Qˇ) where Q is interpretated as Q1, the quan-
tifier “there exists uncountably many.” In this section we consider only structures
over uncountable universes.
We add the following two rules from [10] to the system presented in Section 3.
Note that the approximation rule of section 4.2 is not included.
¬Qx(x = y ∨ x = z)
Qx∃yφ
∃yQxφ ∨Qy∃xφ
The intuitive meaning of the second rule is that a countable union of countable
sets is countable. The first is needed to avoid Q being interpreted as the quantifier
“the exists at least two.”
For each D(Q, Qˇ) sentence σ
H1x1 . . .H
mxm∃y1 . . . ∃yn
( ∧
1≤i≤n
=(x¯i, yi) ∧ θ
)
in normal form we define the Skolem translation Sσ of σ to be:
H1x1 . . .H
mxmθ(fi(x¯
i)/yi),
where the fi’s are new function symbols of the right arity. If σ is a sentence in the
signature τ then Sσ will be in the extended signature τ ∪ { f1, . . . , fn }.
The last rule of the deduction system is the following:
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σ
[Sσ]
...
ψ
(Skolem)
ψ
Here σ is a D(Q, Qˇ) sentence in normal form, and the function symbols f1, . . . , fn
do not occur in ψ nor in any uncancelled assumption of the derivation of ψ, except
for Sσ.
Proposition 4.6. If T ⊢ φ in the deduction system for D(Q1, Qˇ1) then T  φ.
Proof. We extend the proof of Proposition 3.3 to also cover the three new rules:
(1) The soundness of the first rule is easily seen by observing that the formula
Q1x(x = y ∨ x = z) is a FO(Q1) formula and thus a team satisfies it iff every
assignment in the team satisfies the formula.
(2) For the second rule we need to prove that if M, X  Γ, Q1x∃yφ then M, X 
Γ, ∃yQ1xφ ∨ Q1y∃xφ. By the assumption we get functions F : X → QM and f :
X [F/x]→M such thatM, X [F/x][f/y]  φ. Thus, for each s ∈ X there is a binary
relation Rs = { (a, f(s[a/y])) | a ∈ F (s) } such that (M,Rs)  Q1x∃yR(x, y). Let
Y = { s ∈ X | (M,Rs)  ∃yQ1xR(x, y) }
and
Z = { s ∈ X | (M,Rs)  Q1y∃xR(x, y) } .
By the validity of the rule for FO(Q1) we see that X = Y ∪ Z.
It should be clear that Y  ∃yQ1xφ since by letting g(s) be such that (M,Rs) 
Q1xR(x, g(s)) and
G(s[g(s)/y]) = { a ∈M | (M,Rs)  R(a, g(s)) } ,
we have that Y [g/y][G/x] ⊆ X [F/x][f/y] and thus by downward closure
M, Y [g/y][G/x]  φ.
Similarly we can prove that M, Z  Q1y∃xφ, and thus that M, X  Γ, ∃yQ1xφ∨
Q1y∃xφ.
(3) For the Skolem rule assume that there is a derivation of ψ from Γ ending with
the Skolem rule. Then there are shorter derivations from Γ of σ and from Γ, Sσ of
ψ. By the induction hypothesis we get Γ  σ and Γ, Sσ  ψ. We will prove that
Γ  ψ, by assuming M, X  Γ for some non-empty X and proving that M, X  ψ.
From the proof of Theorem 3.5 in [5] we see that M  σ iff M  ∃f1 . . . ∃fkSσ.
From M, X  Γ and Γ  σ we get that M  σ and thus there are f1, . . . , fk such
that (M, f1, . . . , fk)  Sσ. Now since the fi’s do not occur in formulas Γ
′ ⊆ Γ used
in the derivation of ψ, M, X  Γ implies that (M, f1, . . . , fk), X  Γ
′. By locality,
we also have (M, f1, . . . , fk), X  Sσ. Therefore, by the induction hypothesis, we
get that (M, f1, . . . , fk), X  ψ, and, since the fi’s do not occur in ψ, M, X  ψ
follows. 
Theorem 4.7. If T is a set of D(Q1, Qˇ1) sentences and φ is a FO(Q1, Qˇ1) sentence
then T ⊢ φ iff T  φ.
Proof. Assume T 0 φ. We build a model of T ′ = T ∪ {¬φ } 0 ⊥ by translating
sentences σ of T into normal form σnf and considering the FO(Q, Qˇ) theory TS =
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{Sσnf | σ ∈ T } ∪ {¬φ }. This theory is consistent, since otherwise the Skolem rule
and Proposition 4.1 would allow us to derive a contradiction from T ′.
Since the deduction system for D(Q1, Qˇ1) contains Keisler’s system [10] we may
apply the completeness theorem for FO(Q1) and get a model M of TS ∪ {¬φ }. By
the remark made in the proof of Proposition 4.6 and Proposition 4.1 M is also a
model of T ∪ {¬φ }. Thus T 2 φ. 
5. Conclusion
In this article we have presented inference rules and axioms for extensions of
dependence logic by monotone generalized quantifiers. We also proved two com-
pleteness results for FO(Q) consequences in the cases where Q either has a weak
interpretation or Q it is interpreted as “there exists uncountable many.” In the first
completeness theorem, an important feature of the proof is the approximation of a
D(Q1, Qˇ1) sentence by an infinite set of FO(Q) sentences. In the second complete-
ness theorem the approximations were replaced by the Skolem rule which however
is slightly unsatisfactory due to the extra function symbols fi used in its formu-
lation. In future work our plan is to further analyze the completeness theorem of
D(Q1, Qˇ1), and replace the Skolem rule with rules that do not rely on the explicit
use of the Skolem functions fi.
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